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VI. CONCLUSION..................................................90
The fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance. It means that
every[one], everywhere, should be free to develop his [or her] talents to
their full potential-unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth
or income.
Lyndon B. Johnson
We have an obligation and a responsibility to be investing in our
students and our schools. We must make sure that people who have the
grades, the desire and the will, but not the money, can still get the best
education possible.
Barack Obama (October 2004)1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a pervasive ethos in America that there should be an equal
opportunity for all, regardless of race, class, or lineage, to attain
whatever amount of wealth, professional prestige, and social status that
our hard work and overall merit entitle us. Most in America believe
society ought to guarantee equality of opportunity to succeed but not
equality of results. However, in order to make the argument that
equality of opportunity is superior to equality of results, there must first
exist a genuine opportunity for every individual to "develop his [or her]
talents to their full Sotential-unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race
or birth or income.
Social inequality is justified as the necessary result of a free market
competition amongst individuals. The free in free market competition is
italicized to emphasize that for any competition to be equal or fair, there
must exist a means of assuring that everyone is similarly equipped.
However, free market competition alone cannot serve as morally
justifying the coexistence of poverty alongside enormous wealth. The
meritocratic effects of intergenerational privilege must be equalized for
there to be a semblance of equal opportunity that can begin to justify
unequal results and pervasive social inequality. 3 An equitable
1. Ronald Roach, Obama Rising, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Oct. 7, 2004, at
20.
2. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: the
Fifth Freedom (Feb. 5, 1968) (Presidential Papers, 54) [hereinafter Presidential Papers].
3. Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human
Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1205-06 (1987)
("The prevailing view is that human welfare is best guaranteed by the 'free market,' which
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distribution of the foundational tools required for success in both the
market and for democratic participation is necessary. America relies on
education as the foundation for justifying what is presumed to be an
American meritocracy where equality of results is not a legitimate end
for the government to pursue.
Many Americans would likely say that based on these equality
concerns, the right to public education is logically more fundamental
than the right to interstate travel, but under current precedent, it is
interstate travel that is more fundamental.4 Therefore, any law
undermining the fundamental right to travel is accorded strict scrutiny
and is thereby presumptively unconstitutional. Education rights do not
receive similar treatment.6 Unlike travel, education is subject to a
rational basis test, which is the most relaxed test of equal protection
scrutiny.7 However, the rights to public education and travel are
fundamentally different, so that education should not be subject to the
same form of constitutional protection as the right to travel. The
concern with the right to travel is the freedom from government action,
whereas the central aim of a public education right is for government to
act. The entire point of a right to public education is for government to
guarantee what President Lyndon B. Johnson called the fifth freedom.
"The fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance."8
Thus, there is a necessity for high-quality public education,
particularly primary and secondary education, which is the focus of this
Article.9 In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson proclaimed the duty to
provide public education as the fifth freedom.10 In doing so, President
Johnson recognized that education-the freedom from ignorance-is an
essential human right that is of equal standing with what President
Franklin D. Roosevelt described as the "four essential human
freedoms.""
offers infinite economic opportunity to provide for the well-being of all Americans, if only
people would exert themselves properly. However, the myth of equal economic opportunity is
belied by the demographic reality").
4. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (holding that regulation
"touch[ing] on the fundamental right of interstate movement" must promote a compelling state
interest) (emphasis added). See also JESSE L. JACKSON, JR. & FRANK E. WATKINS, A MORE
PERFECT UNION ADVANCING NEW AMERICAN RIGHTS 330 (1st ed. 2001).
5. See id. at 660.
6. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1973).
7. Id. at 62; Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1157 (1999) ("[A]ny reasonably
conceivable state of facts ... could provide a rational basis for the classification....
8. Presidential Papers, supra note 2, at 54.
9. This Article deals with primary and secondary education and does not attempt to
address higher education.
10. See Presidential Papers, supra note 2, at 54.
11. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address to the 77th Congress,
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Without President Lyndon B. Johnson's fifth freedom in the form of
public education, there is no equal opportunity for those born to less
wealthy, less privileged families.' 2 Public education is a means by
which governments ensure that all people enter the market with the
foundational tools to compete without handicap or unfair disadvantage
arising from the intergenerational effects of wealth that lie outside an
individual's control.13 Without providing an education system adequate
to provide equal opportunity, the U.S. founding values of equality will
be compromised. At least since Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S.
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the significance of education
to the contemporary American experience.14
The national wealth of the United States makes the realization of a
fundamental right to public education a real possibility.15 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court's liberty-centered constitutional rights doctrine has
short-circuited what otherwise should have been a realization of a
constitutional duty to provide public education.16 The infamous San
Antonio v. Rodriguez holding that the U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly protect a right to public education is dubious since the Court
already recognizes many rights that find no explicit support in
in 1940 PUB. PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKIUN D. 663, 672 (Jan. 6, 1941). In his 1941 State
of the Union Address, President Roosevelt proclaimed the four essential freedoms are: (1)
Freedom of Expression, (2) Freedom of Worship, (3) Freedom from Want, and (4) Freedom
from Fear. These four freedoms were later artistically memorialized as American icons by
Norman Rockwell's famous Four Freedoms Series in the Saturday Evening Post in 1943. See
Norman Rockwell, Freedom from Fear, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Mar. 13, 1943; Norman
Rockwell, Freedom of Speech, SATURDAY EVENING PoST, Feb. 20, 1943; Norman Rockwell,
Freedom from Want, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Mar. 6, 1943; Norman Rockwell, Freedom to
Worship, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Feb. 27, 1943; Norman Rockwell's Four Freedoms (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.best-norman-rockwell-art.com/four-freedoms.
html.
12. President Johnson announced that freedom from ignorance ought to be added to
FDR's list of essential human freedoms as the fifth freedom. Presidential Papers, supra note 2, at
54; Mark R. Shulman, The "War on Terror" Its Over-Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms
as a Foundation for Peace and Security, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 263, 297 (2009); see Mark
R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms: Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time
of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557-72 (2008) (discussing the history of the Four
Freedoms).
13. Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration
of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1336 (2004) (suggesting that education is most
improved when disadvantaged children are placed in wealthier schools).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
15. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: The
Fifth Freedom (Feb. 5, 1968) (Presidential Papers, 54) [hereinafter Presidential Papers]; Ann 1.
Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform
Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1228-32 (1987).
16. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1973) (holding that
there is no fundamental right to public education under the U.S. Constitution).
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constitutional language.' 7 The holding that U.S. history, traditions, and
developing cultural understandings do not warrant recognition of an
implied fundamental right to public education is just plain wrong.' 8
The current doctrine, which wrongly states that there is no right to
public education, flows from a profound confusion regarding
fundamental rights as duties. Negative rights encompass what we
traditionally consider to be civil liberties. These liberties function as
bars to government actions that either discriminate against a protected
class or infringe upon protected conduct. Viewed from the perspective
of rights as liberties, the concern with declaring a fundamental right to
public education is that strict scrutiny of education legislation would
prevent the enactment of laws regarding education.19 This would not be
a concern if the Court embraced a constitutional analysis that
specifically applied to positive rights and duties.20
Today's education problem is inextricably linked to race and wealth.
Poor, urban, predominantly African American and Latino schools
provide a quality of education that is substantially inferior to that of
wealthier, suburban, predominantly white schools. 2 1 The modern
17. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 10.1 (3d
ed. 2006). Judicially recognized rights include: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
interracial marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
procreate); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to interstate travel); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to direct a child's upbringing); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (right to abortion included in right to privacy); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (right to refuse medical treatment).
18. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17.
19. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); see Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 61-62 (Stewart, J., concurring) (regarding strict scrutiny).
20. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End ofNational Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550,
574-79 (1992) (discussing the application of positive rights).
21. See also Eric P. Christofferson, Rodriguez Reexamined: The Misnomer of "Local
Control" and a Constitutional Case for Equitable Public School Funding, 90 GEO. L.J. 2553,
2553-55 (2002) ("[d]isparities in the quality of education from one school district to the next are
both real and considerable).
Not surprisingly, achievement disparities among districts strongly correlate
with disparities in wealth. School budgets are funded primarily through local
property taxes, such that the total budget almost completely depends upon the
individual school district's overall wealth. For example, the disparity in annual
per pupil expenditures between the poorest school district and the wealthiest
school district in Pennsylvania is nearly ten thousand dollars, which translates
into roughly a five million dollar disparity per school per year. In an age in
which most education experts agree that smaller classroom size translates into
greater learning and achievement, we do not need experts to tell us how far five
million dollars per year can go toward hiring more teachers and improving
infrastructure to accommodate more students in healthier learning
49
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euphemistic framing of so-called urban aspects to educational
inequality is clearly demonstrated by significantly higher drop-out rates
in many of the nation's major cities such as Chicago, where the rate has
been as high as 40%.22 The 1985 National Commission on Excellence
in Education reported that 13% of all seventeen year olds in the United
States were functionally illiterate, while the functional illiteracy of
minority youths was as high as 40%. Finally, the study found that
schools with a high percentage of students who are one or more years
below their grade level also had a high percentage of poor children and
racial minorities.2 3
Education problems in poor, urban, and predominantly minority
communities are the result of numerous factors, including an antiquated
curriculum, inexperienced and underpaid teachers, and higher student-
to-teacher ratios when compared to wealthier, predominantly white
suburban districts.24 Factors in addition to school financing exacerbate
the education problem. Students in poor, urban districts tend to have
greater educational needs than students in the suburbs because of
background factors such as poverty, poorly educated parents,
malnutrition, high crime rates and limited English proficiency, to name
a few.25 It follows that merely equalizing funding to districts will not
alleviate the pervasive problems of unequal education. 26 What is needed
is full protection of the right to equal access to a high quality public
education.
This Article explains why there is a fundamental duty for the
environments.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Brenna Bridget Mahoney, Children at Risk: The Inequality of
Urban Education, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 161, 162 (1991); Susan Aud et al., Dept. of Educ.,
The Condition of Education 6-15 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010028.pdf
(discussing the quality of education in predominantly poor minority, black, Asian, Latino/a,
areas; the inequity of results, the inequity of quality of teachers, the poorest having only
bachelors degrees while the wealthiest have mostly masters degrees).
22. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 167 ("Dropout rates are also significantly higher in
many of the nation's major cities . . . 'Chicago's dropout rate in recent years was approximately
40%' .... ).
23. Emily Forrest Cataldi et al., Dept. of Educ., High School Dropout and Completion
Rates in the United States: 2007 Compendium Report, 3-7 (2009).
24. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 169.
25. Id; see also ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 5 (2003); see Mahoney, supra note 21, at 169.
26. The additional costs of attending urban schools include: support for students from
low-income families, such as healthcare, counseling, remedial programs, and combating hunger,
as well as the costs of vandalism, security, and the higher consumer price index in urban areas.
Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?,
56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1630-31 (2007).
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government to provide public education under the U.S. Constitution.27
Numerous scholars and public officials have written on the need to
overrule San Antonio v. Rodriguez or adopt alternative approaches to
recognizing a right to public education either judicially or by way of
constitutional amendment.28 This Article identifies a consistent and
systemic reluctance by the Court to meaningfully enforce positive
rights, which are the duties that the government owes to the people. In
doing so, it explores the consistent recognition throughout American
history that education is a fundamental duty of government.
When the Supreme Court issued its infamous holding in San Antonio
v. Rodriguez, it did so using the language of negative rights.29 However,
even as the Court failed to recognize a fundamental right, it
simultaneously upheld existing precedent that recognized the
government's special duty to provide public education. 30 Recognizing
the fundamental duty to public education as a positive right would
correct a major inconsistency in U.S. constitutional law and help bring
fundamental rights doctrine more in line with broader understandings of
social justice. In order to safeguard the fundamental right to public
education, a new form of fundamental rights analysis for positive rights
must be developed. The details of such a rights analysis will take time,
but it must begin with an understanding that traditional strict scrutiny
analysis cannot be applied to positive rights as they are to negative
rights.
Part II discusses the development of fundamental rights under the
U.S. Constitution. Part II ends with recognition that despite a
comprehensive jurisprudence regarding individual liberties, there is a
dearth of jurisprudence regarding constitutional duties owed to
individuals, which are also known as positive rights. Part III examines
the normative justifications for recognizing a fundamental duty to
provide public education by examining the educational philosophies of
such luminaries as Thomas Jefferson and John Dewey alongside today's
international human rights laws.31 Part IV describes and criticizes the
27. Fundamental rights are unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has recognized as
so important and linked to U.S. historic traditions that they are accorded full protection under
the U.S. Constitution. A fundamental duty refers to an obligation for the government to act, as
opposed to freedom from government infringement.
28. See H.R.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); JESSE L. JACKSON JR. & FRANK E.
WATKINS, A MORE PERFECT UNION ADVANCING NEW AMERICAN RIGHTS 329-49 (1st ed. 2001).
29. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
30. See id. at 29-30.
31. See EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739-40 (Sol Cohen
ed., 1974) [hereinafter EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES]; JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION 4 (1916); U.N. Charter pmbl., paras. 2, 4 (describing the duty of the state to promote
its citizens' higher standards of living and fundamental freedoms); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
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current doctrine regarding the right to public education as inconsistent
with the aspirational holding of Brown v. Board ofEducation.32 It builds
from Justice Marshall's Rodriguez dissent and includes a critique of the
Court's use of federalism, race neutrality, and exposes the Court's
reluctance to recognize positive rights and duties.3 Part V discusses
possible approaches to judicially enforcing a right to public education. It
explores the limits of current fundamental rights doctrines that are based
in negative rather than positive rights and the resulting need to develop
a new form of rights analysis that applies in the context of fundamental
duties owed to individuals.
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Fundamental rights as a term is relatively new,34 but the concept has
been developing ever since the 1868 passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment with its guarantees of equal protection under the law as
well as its protections of the privileges and immunities of citizenship.3 5
The U.S. Supreme Court is most comfortable in recognizing negative
rights, which are liberties or zones of protection from government
action. However, the Court has struggled with how to recognize positive
rights or duties, which represent obligations of the government to act.
Lochner Era economic substantive due process inspired the
12, 1948) (U.N. non-binding resolution declaring, among other things, that the right to public
education is a human right).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (the first usage of the term, fundamental
rights, by the U.S. Supreme Court); see Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1214 (8th Cir. 1990)
(listing line of Supreme Court cases establishing fundamental rights in which Meyer is the
earliest case).
35. As stated in the Fourteenth Amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872) ("The
Slaughterhouse Cases are a consolidation of the following cases: Butchers' Benevolent
Association of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Company; Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J.P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William
Fagan, JD. Broderick, N Seibel, M Lannes, J. Gitzinger, JP. Aycock, D. Verges, Live-Stock
Dealers' and Butchers' Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. State of
Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General") ("[tihe fundamental rights, privileges, and
immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen
of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State.").
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transition in American jurisprudential thought toward seriously
protecting the individual liberties that are recognized today as
fundamental rights. Under the current fundamental rights doctrine, the
significance of declaring a right to be fundamental is that any
governmental infringement on a fundamental right triggers strict
scrutiny. 36 If public education were declared a fundamental right, then
under the current doctrine, any law infringing the right would trigger
this strict scrutiny. Unfortunately, strict scrutiny is a liberty-centered
approach that does not address the duties of the government. This
analysis does not require that certain laws be passed, only that those
laws that are passed do not infringe the right. The current liberty-
centered fundamental rights analysis would not directly address the goal
of creating a duty for the government to provide education that goes
beyond a protection from infringement on a negative right.
A. Defining Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights are not explicitly stated in the text of the
Constitution, but they are defined as unenumerated rights that are so
important that they are nonetheless recognized as being of equal stature
to enumerated rights. The definition of a fundamental right is inexact
and therefore leaves many with concerns that members of the Court will
unjustifiably expand the scope of protected fundamental rights, and in
so doing, overstep their appropriate judicial roles.3 7
Today, fundamental rights are defined as those rights that are so
rooted in the nation's history and traditions that the Supreme Court
36. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 241. Strict scrutiny requires that the
discriminatory behavior must satisfy a compelling interest in order to be justified. In another
line of cases, the Supreme Court recognized certain fundamental rights under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
(recognizing voting as a fundamental right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963)
(asserting that counsel must be made available on first criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (declaring a right to trial transcripts on criminal appeal); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (ruling that there is a right to
procreate). The Court declined, however, to extend this strand of equal protection doctrine to
positive entitlements such as welfare, housing, and education. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (denying to extend a strict level of scrutiny of the equal
protection doctrine to education); Dandridge v. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
(denying the extension to housing); Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (denying the extension
to welfare).
37. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Indianapolis,
Bobbs-Merrill 1962); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REv. 204, 205 (1980); see also LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION (1991).
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recognizes them as fundamental.38 The right to public education easily
fits within the expansive definition of a fundamental right being rooted
in the nation's history and traditions.3 9 However, this has been rejected,
in part because of broader constitutional concerns about the Court
possibly overstepping its proper judicial role and inappropriately
constraining legislative actions.
The doctrine regarding non-textual fundamental rights has raised
concerns about the Court's power as an unelected body to set
constitutional limits and guarantees that are not explicitly stated within
the Constitution's text.40 The continuing debate regarding appropriate
methods of constitutional construction is sometimes characterized as a
debate about the app ropriateness of various originalist and non-
originalist approaches.
Concerns regarding the powers of an unelected body to constrain and
even overturn the will of a democratically elected majority are central to
the contemporary calls for judicial restraint.42 Today's fears of judicial
activism are born from very different circumstances than the modern
day liberal, activist judge label implies.
Judicial restraint-based arguments have been generally applied to
limit the expansion of fundamental rights, and they have been
specifically applied in the context of public education.43 Ironically, the
root of such concern comes, not from excessive expansions of
individual rights, but rather from a period when the Court expanded
economic rights to the detriment of individual rights." A duty to
provide a public education is very different from the types of rights the
Court was protecting in its controversial, pro-business Lochner Era
38. Derek Black, Unlocking The Power of State Constitutions With Equal Protection: The
First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343,
1409-10 (2006); see id.; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195-97 (1989) (noting that the purpose of the due process clause was to protect the people from
the State and not to ensure that the State protected them from each other); see also Jackson v.
City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties").
39. See infra Part III.
40. See ELY, supra note 37; BICKEL, supra note 37; Brest, supra note 37, at 205; TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 37.
41. See ELY, supra note 37; BICKEL, supra note 37; Brest, supra note 37, at 205; TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 37.
42. See ELY, supra note 37; BICKEL, supra note 37; Brest, supra note 37, at 205; TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 37.
43. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973) (discussing the
need for judicial restraint).
44. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (invalidating minimum
wage law as exceeding scope of Congress's power); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78-83
(1872) (limiting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, compare with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (upholding "liberty of contract")).
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jurisprudence. 45 In fact, the imposition of duties were precisely what the
Court sought to forbid during that period.46 Yet the activism critiques of
the Lochner Era's so-called economic liberties are today used to thwart
progress in developing doctrines regarding governmental duties.
Substantive due process, under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is viewed as the precursor to today's
fundamental rights doctrine. Substantive due process developed during
the period between 1887 to 1937, which is frequently described as the
Lochner Era in American jurisprudential history.47 This period saw a
conservative U.S. Supreme Court strike down more legislation as
unconstitutional than had ever been so declared in the first 100 years of
U.S. history.
The conservative Lochner Era Court expanded Fourteenth
Amendment protections to business relations in the form of economic
rights, while simultaneously and dramatically limiting many of the
individual rights protections that were plainly written into the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 49  Using the Fifth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court expanded the concept of due process
during this period to require substantive reasons for depriving a person
or business of their life, liberty, or property.50 This doctrine accorded
the Court broad and sweeping powers to thwart progressive legislation
45. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 617 (1936) (invalidating a
state minimum wage law for women); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918)
(holding law that prohibits the transportation of goods interstate made by child labor
unconstitutional).
46. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-317 (invalidating minimum wage law as exceeding scope
of Congress's power); Morehead, 298 U.S. at 617 (invalidating a state minimum wage law for
women); Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276-77 (holding law that prohibits the transportation of goods
interstate made by child labor unconstitutional); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
16-18 (1895) (holding that a sugar monopoly was legal because the constitution does not allow
Congress to regulate manufacturing).
47. The Lochner Era takes its name from Lochner v. New York. The infamous Lochner
case applied the laissez-faire economic theory of the era to specifically overturn minimum wage
and hour laws regulating New York bakers.
48. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17; Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The
Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L.
REv. 751, 754 n.19 (2009).
49. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17; Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 38 (limiting the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and its application). Cf Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (upholding "liberty of contract"); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (invalidating minimum wage law as exceeding scope of Congress's power).
50. Economic Substantive due process is "[t]he doctrine that certain social policies, such
as the freedom of contract or the right to enjoy property without interference by government
regulation, exist in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, particularly in the words
'liberty' and 'property."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (9th ed. 2009); Nourse, supra note 48,
at 751-53; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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passed by federal and state governments.5' However, in the context of
individual rights, the Court continued to find that there were no such
constitutional protections. Protecting workers from deplorable working
conditions and racist hiring practices was seen as beyond the scope of
the federal government's powers under the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment powers.52 This continued even as the
doctrine of economic substantive due process was expanded to further
protect business and commerce.
The Lochner Era drew to a close with the recognition that the
activist, conservative justices were overstepping their judicial role, and
in so doing, undermining the Court's institutional legitimacy by
functioning as a super-legislature.53 President Roosevelt's famous
court-packing plan was a significant manifestation of the popular
resentment and distrust that the Court's illegitimate rulings
engendered. 54 The Lochner Era's legacy is a continuing concern
regarding activist judges unjustly and improperly thwarting the will of
the majority by misapplying and expanding rights.
The conservative, economic substantive due process doctrine of the
Lochner Era was largely repudiated by the end of the period.
However, this anti-progressive doctrine formed a foundation for
circumventing problematic Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in
order to advance the individual rights protections that are more
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 Carolene Products
51. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-317 (invalidating minimum wage law as exceeding scope of
Congress's power); Morehead, 298 U.S. at 617 (invalidating a state minimum wage law for
women); Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268-77 (holding law preventing the transportation of goods
interstate made by child labor unconstitutional); E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16-18 (finding a
sugar monopoly legal because the Constitution does not allow Congress to regulate
manufacturing).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868); Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (limiting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and its application);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding Congress's ability to use its power under the
Reconstruction Amendments to end slavery, not to regulate private conduct).
53. See BICKEL, supra note 37; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 37; Brest, supra note 37, at 205.
54. See BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE
TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (1st ed. 2009). The court packing plan was as a legislative initiative to
add more justices to the Supreme Court by President Franklin Roosevelt to obtain favorable
rulings concerning portions of the New Deal that were previously ruled unconstitutional. David
S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, GEo. L.J. 779, 787 (2011).
55. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
56. See Robin West, Rights Harms and Duties: A Response to Justice for Hedgehogs, 90
B.U. L. REV. 819, 831-33 (2010); Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget The Fundamentals: Fixing
Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 983, 1000-04 (2006); Joshua Herman, Death
Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges To The Federal Death Penalty Act, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1832 (2004); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
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footnote four, often regarded as the most important footnote in
American law, notably renounced the economic substantive due process
doctrine, while simultaneously acknowledging the possibility of
applying ananalogous doctrine to protect "discrete and insular
minorities."57 Later cases took this insight and applied it to develop the
modem doctrines of equal protection and fundamental rights.
B. The New Deal Era and Neo-Lochner Era
During Roosevelt's New Deal, social welfare legislation was
successfully passed, created entitlements. 59 These entitlements were
significant because they statutorily mandated and defined positive
duties that the federal government owed to the people. Prior to the New
Deal, the federal government was rarely thought to have these sorts of
duties. 60 The federal role was seen as limited to the most basic notions
of pro the national welfare and not interfering with private
individuals. The New Deal legislation invested Americans with the
first meaningful set of positive rights owed to them by the federal
government.
Positive rights and duties are in some ways the opposite of the
negative rights or liberties that the Court has been more comfortable
recognizing. Positive rights are obligations that the government owes
the people.63 Positive rights represent duties to act as opposed to
(1938).
57. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
58. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 624; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that a state law prohibiting the use and distribution of
contraceptives is unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding
that the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place in the field of public education, since
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
59. Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1965));
see ANDRE ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY VISIONS AND REVISIONS (1986); http://www.fdr
heritage.org/new deal.htm; Franklin D. Roosevelt American Heritage Center Museum, New
Deal Achievements, available at http://www.fdrhertage.org/newdeal.htm.
60. BASIL RAUCH, THE HISTORY OF THE NEw DEAL, Preface (Capricorn Books 1963)
(1944); Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the
New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 259, 266 (2000); see Reuel E. Schiller, The Era
of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106
MICH. L. REv. 399, 407-12 (2007).
61. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding the law that prevented the
transportation of goods interstate made by child labor unconstitutional); see generally Charles
0. Jackson, Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal (Princeton University Press 1970); Don
Lawson, FDR's New Deal (1st ed. 1979).
62. See generally CHARLES 0. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEw DEAL
(Princeton University Press 1970); DON LAWSON, FDR's NEw DEAL (1st ed. 1979).
63. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2002); RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); see also Helen
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negative rights, which are defined as limitations on how far government
can act.64 To recognize a ri ht to public education would require the
government to fulfill a duty. The Fourteenth Amendment's privileges
or immunities clause was effectively read out of existence for so long,
in large part, because of a deeply entrenched discomfort with positive
rights.6
The New Deal Era's expansion of federal government duties
continued well past the time of Roosevelt and continues today. Today,
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other social welfare programs
are treated as statutory rights or duties that, while not constitutionally
mandated, are nonetheless legally binding obligations of the federal
government.67 Later efforts, such as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA), and the more recent amendments to ESEA in the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) fit within the New Deal Era's framework of the
statutory expansion of the government's duty to provide public
education. 68
Hershkoff, "JUST WORDS": Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social
and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1540 (2010); Curt Bentley, Constrained by the
Liberal Tradition: Why the Supreme Court Has Not Found Positive Rights in the American
Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1721, 1733-34 (2007); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1315
(1984).
64. See Hershkoff, supra note 63, at 1520, 1533-34, 1554; Bentley, supra note 63, at
1721, 1765 n.2; Kreimer, supra note 63, 1325-26; DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY, supra note 63, at 120; DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 63, at 266-67.
65. See Hershkoff, supra note 63, at 1520, 1533-34, 1554; Bentley, supra note 63, at
1721, 1765 n.2; Kreimer, supra note 63, 1325-26; DwoRKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY, supra note 63, at 120; DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 63, at 266-67.
66. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 59 (1873) (limiting the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-26 (1883) (holding that Congress
has the ability to use its power under the Reconstruction Amendments to end slavery, not to
regulate private conduct). In the context of the privileges and immunities clause jurisprudence,
the Slaughterhouse Cases effectively read out of existence the privileges of citizenship until the
1999 case of Saenz v. Roe. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1999).
67. Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem
of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1077-78
(1997).
68. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 118 Stat. 2647 (2004);
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 79 Stat. 27 (1965); Wayne Batchis, Urban
Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational Inequality as an Impetus to Low Density Living, 42
URB. LAw. 95, 95-96, 99-100, 103, 111-12 (2010); Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State
Constitutions With Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected
Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1413-16 (2010); Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a
Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 953,
954-57 (1998).
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The manner in which the Lochner Era's liberty of contract doctrine
thwarted progressive legislation regarding individual rights and
governmental duties continues today. Economic libertarianism, as
evidenced by such cases as Citizens United,6 9 where almost seventy-
three years later popular legislation that is meant to preserve and protect
the rights of the least powerful is again declared unconstitutional based
on its impact on businesses, who as juridical people, are once again
accorded rights akin to actual people.7o Lochner Era jurisprudence had
to shift in order for the government to create and fulfill statutory rights
and duties that helped bring an end to the Great Depression. 71 Likewise,
the modern era's libertarian perspective must now shift to recognize
positive rights and duties as a constitutional imperative in order to exit
the current economic downturn.72
The Lochner Era, which ended in the midst of the Great Depression,
saw the rise of legal doctrines that expanded the rights of business and
commerce by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Lochner Era
also saw the continued narrowing of constitutionally guaranteed
protections and rights that were guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.74
Today, we stand in the midst of what has been described as the
greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression.75 Much like the
69. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 885-86 (2010).
70. Id. (finding that under the First Amendment, corporate funding of independent
political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited).
71. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (Harper &
Row 1963); ELLIOT A. ROSEN, ROOSEVELT, THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AND THE EcoNOMICs OF
RECOVERY (Univ. of Virginia Press 2005); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL (Houghton Mifflin Company 1958).
72. See ROBERT REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE ECONOMY AND AMERICA'S FUTURE (2010).
73. The Lochner Era takes its name from Lochner v. New York, which clearly
demonstrated the legal theory, economic, and social beliefs of the Court and how those beliefs
were applied. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. See Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REv.
1319, 1338-39 (2008) ("[tlhe Commerce Clause has [shifted] from modestly broad under the
Marshall Court to rather narrow in the Lochner era"); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and
Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 647, 655 (2008).
The Supreme Court has limited Congress's ability to address national
problems to a degree only matched by the Lochner Court's interference with
attempts by Congress and the President to respond to the Great Depression.
This includes: restricting the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment; expanding state immunity from federally defined claims of
unfair labor practices and discrimination.
Id.
75. See Wylie v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 09 CV 04542, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. July 21,
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prelude to the Great Depression, which was preceded by the Lochner
Era, the current economic collapse that began in 2008 was preceded by
a period of rights expansion for business and commerce. Both the
Lochner and Reagan eras saw an expansion of business rights during a
simultaneous narrowing of civil rights protections for individuals. 76
Reagan Era business deregulation, rights expansion, and subsequent
economic collapse harkens back to Lochner Era business rights
expansion and the Great Depression. 7 The Great Depression inspired a
national reassessment of business rights versus civil rights and human
rights. Likewise, the current economic collapse ought to motivate a
similar national reassessment of what rights ought to be.
The Lochner Era ended with the New Deal Era, which saw the
creation of new statutory rights and duties. The conservative period that
led up to the current economic collapse ought to inspire a similar
reassessment of rights that sees the recognition of expanded
constitutional rights and duties, including the constitutional duty to
provide public education.
III. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
Thomas Jefferson and his fellow founding fathers wrote official
declarations and papers that espoused a civic philosophy that public
education is essential to a democracy.7 9 They espoused normative
arguments favoring public education that have continued to be
articulated by more contemporary educational philosophers like John
Dewey.so Moving beyond the realm of American educational
philosophy, international human rights conventions and treaties also
present normative justifications for public education as an international
2010) (explaining that homeowners throughout the Unites States have experienced a dramatic
decrease in the value of their homes due to the most serious lending and economic crisis facing
the nations since the Great Depression); Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 333
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'VY 557, 582 (2010) ("[tlhe 2008 economic crisis [was] the worst since the
Great Depression").
76. Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights, 93 VA. L. REv. In Brief 85, 96
(2007) ("African Americans' enjoyment of contract and property rights had been central to
Reconstruction-era ideas of civil rights, but during the Lochner era the Court largely divorced
due process rights from those of African Americans").
77. Id. ("African Americans' enjoyment of contract and property rights had been central
to Reconstruction-era ideas of civil rights, but during the Lochner era the Court largely divorced
due process rights from those of African Americans").
78. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 624 (quoting Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of
Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 397); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 .S.
141 n.4 (1938).
79. See EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31; DEWEY, supra note 31.
80. See DEWEY, supra note 31.
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human right. 8 ' This indicates strong foundational support for the right to
public education as well as an obligation under international law to
fulfill the basic human right to public education.
A. Philosophical and Historical Support for the Right to Education
The founders of America were supporters of free public education
and during their time sponsored initiatives to further public education.82
Thomas Jefferson's several writings on the subject of public education83
and his Virginia "Bill for the General Diffusion of Knowledge" 84 of
1779 demonstrate his educational philosophy.8 5 Jefferson championed,
in his 1779 bill, public funding for building schools and guaranteed all
free children three years of free, public education. 86 The purpose of the
bill was to teach all children reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Jefferson's educational philosophy was somewhat conservative relative
to today's standards, given his belief in a "natural aristocracy amongst
81. See, e.g., Ann Fagan Ginger, What is the U.S. Constitution Today, 9 J.L. & Soc.
CHALLENGES 107, 112 (2008).
The United States agreed to "promote" throughout the United States and its
territories: "high standards of living and full employment," specifically
mentioning health, culture, and education . . . [t]here are human rights not
mentioned in the Bill of Rights or Reconstruction Amendments, but since the
Great Depression, more and more Americans include them in the phrase
"human rights."
Id. According to the Ginger, "All are mentioned in the U.N. Charter art. 55. They are spelled
out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id. n.42.
82. Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, in ESSAYS,
LITERARY, MORAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 8-13 (1806), reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 31, at 758-60; Samuel Knox, An Essay on the Best System of Liberal
Education, Adapted to the Genius of the Government of the United States (Baltimore, 1799),
reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 776-80; see Thomas Jefferson,
Bill for the More General Difusion of Knowledge, in The Works of Thomas Jefferson vol. 2, at
414-26 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904), reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31,
at 739-44.
83. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Amending the Constitution of William and
Mary, and Substituting More Certain Revenues for Its Support (1779), in Sundry Documents on
the Subject of a System of Public Education for the State of Virginia, 56-60 (1817), reprinted in
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 745-47; Thomas Jefferson, From Thomas
Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), in the Papers of Thomas Jefferson 243-45 (1954),
reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 750-51; Thomas Jefferson,
Notes on the State of Virginia, with an appendix, 202-03 (1801), reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 747-51.
84. Jefferson, supra 82, at 739-44.
85. A Virginia bill, sponsored by Thomas Jefferson, called for a school system subsidized
by the state. Jefferson, supra note 82, at 739-44.
86. Id. at 740-41.
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men."87 The bill called for localized funding and maintenance of the
schools, and Jefferson's bill provided for the continued education of
children of superior ability whose parents lacked the funds to pay for
education beyond the three free years.8 8 The rationale behind this
provision was that children should not be deprived of an education
simply because they come from poor families.8 Jefferson believed that
society had a duty to educate children who could not afford education
but had a demonstrated superior intellectual ability. 90 Jefferson
indicated a need for broad public involvement in funding public
education. 91 Samuel Knox's call regarding education was, by
comparison, even broader, as he explicitly called for the broadest form
of public involvement in education.
Samuel Knox's 1799 writing, "An Essay on the Best System of
Liberal Education Adapted to the Genius of the Government of the
United States" was perhaps the earliest call for a national system of
education in America. 93 Knox, a republican thinker, made his call for a
national system of education while making reference to the historical
and illustrious characters of ancient antiquity such as Cicero and other
students of the academy in Athens.9 4 Knox describes the historic
superiority of public education over private education.95 Knox
recognized that given the size of the United States, it would be difficult
to establish a system capable of affording education equally to every
individual in the nation. He analogized those difficulties with
difficulties in forming a national government and concluded that such
difficulties ought not detract from the goal of a national education
system.97 "It does not appear more impracticable to establish an uniform
system of national education, than a system of legislation or civil
government."98 This quote offers an important insight into the way
87. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol. XII 394-403 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1905), reprinted in
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 753.
88. Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779),
reprinted in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 740-41, 744.
89. Id. at 740.
90. Id. at 391.
91. Id. at 740-41.
92. See generally Samuel Knox, An Essay on the Best System of Liberal Education
Adapted to the Genius of the Government of the United States (Baltimore, 1799) (advocating for
a broad system of national education).
93. See EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 391. See generally id.
(making the plea in 1799 for national system of government).
94. Knox, supra note 92.
95. Id
96. Id. at 69.
97. Id.
98. See EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 391 (citing Thomas
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educational systems were originally organized. Although Knox's
proposal was never formally enacted, his approach of paralleling the
structure of educational systems to that of civil governments was
incorporated in Jefferson's bill. 99
These early luminaries were all republicans. This means that they
shared what was then a liberal insight. Their ideology of local control
and weak national government sprang from a desire to protect the
interests of the poor and politically powerless. Under this republican
model, they believed the government could best encourage the
education of all capable citizens, thereby accomplishing the fulfillment
of a liberal vision of education that, at the time, was not underway or
even being considered in Europe. 00 The modern-day educational
system of school districts and local control can be traced back to these
early thinkers, whose motivation was to provide public education in a
manner that they thought would best assure widespread public
education.
Under the more contemporary philosophy of John Dewey, the
ultimate aim of society ought not be the mere production of goods, but
the production of free human beings associated with one another on
terms of equality. 0' Formal education has become increasingly
important as the scope of resources, achievements, and responsibilities
in society has grown more complex.102 No longer can children get by
with a mere three years of formal basic education and from there go on
to apprentice themselves to adults. The apprenticing that was the
primary means of education in the days of Jefferson and Knox is no
longer a viable means of successfully educating citizens for life in
today's vastly more complex and intellectually demanding society.
Education is a necessity of life for Dewey because "what nutrition
and reproduction are to physiological life, education is to social life"-a
means of sustaining and perpetuating that which makes us human.103
Democracy and education are linked because a democratic community
is a form of social life where external authority is repudiated in favor of
Jefferson, Billfor the More General Difusion ofKnowledge (1779)).
99. Id. at 740-41.
100. Id. at 739-40.
101. See DEWEY, supra note 31.
102. See id. at 8.
103.
[B]asic human needs . . . refer to the fundamental requirements of food,
shelter, medical care, and education. Although education may not intuitively
seem necessary to the sustenance of life, the concept of "basic needs," as
applied in development literature, commonly includes education as one of
the five basic needs of human beings.
See id. at 9; see also Park, supra note 3, at 1264 n.1.
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voluntary, interested deliberation.'04 In order to have an all-
encompassing, interested deliberation, society needs a well-educated
citizenry.
Dewey's philosophy is not limited to mere political socialization, for
he appreciated the human need to live and function as a fulfilled and
contributing member of society. 0 5 Recognizing that there is more to the
state's role in providing education than simply preparing its young
citizens to govern demonstrates an underlying belief in a positive view
of the purpose of the state.106 The state's purpose is not only to
safeguard liberty, but also to provide the background opportunity by
which individuals may fully develop their capabilities. 0 7
In sum, American scholars and leaders have historically treated
education as though it were an individual right. This is a vision that
America has carried into the international arena as part of a broader
understanding of international human rights.
B. International Human Rights Conventions
Several U.N. Conventions, including the U.N. Charter, to which the
United States is a party, describe the state's duty to promote higher
standards of living and other fundamental freedoms necessary for the
security of human rights and fundamental freedoms."0 s The U.N.
Charter espouses the broad goals of the United Nations, and depends
upon later provisions, conventions, and treaties to bring full meaning to
its general call for states to recognize and protect human rights.' 09 One
such convention is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of
which the United States is a party."o Article 26 of the Universal
Declaration describes the right to public education as a human right."'
U.S. courts ought to recognize the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as binding, both because the Universal Declaration has been
ratified by the United Statesll2 and because it is widely viewed to have
now attained the status of customary international law. 113 Given that
international treaties are on the same level as federal statutes on the
domestic hierarchy of laws, " the fact that the United States is a party
104. See DEWEY, supra note 31, at 87.
105. See generally id.
106. See id. at 183.
107. See id.
108. U.N. Charter, art. 55.
109. Id.
110. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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to this Convention serves as more than a normative justification for the
right, but describes its actual existence under federal law. 5
The Paquete Habana case of 1900 is the foundation for the domestic
recognition of international law and stands for the proposition that
ratified treaties are binding upon U.S. courts.' 16 In fact, the West
Virginia Supreme Court has held that education is a fundamental right
under its state constitution, and based part of its reasoning on a reading
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
Other authority for a right to public education under international
law is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights," 8 which recognizes a right to public education."19 The United
States is a signatory, but has not yet ratified this covenant.120 The
United States is also a party to the Charter of the Organization of
American States,'21 which, among other things, recognizes a right to
115. Id.
116. See id.; Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law ofNations in the Context of
the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 193, 237 (2005):
In recent times, lower courts have been unanimous in holding that federal
common law incorporates customary international law. In the most
important case to date involving the interpretation of the ATCA, Filartiga v.
Pena Irala (1980), the Court concluded that, "[for the purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him
hostis humani generis, an enemy of mankind." The court in Filartiga
analyzed the abovementioned the Supreme Court decisions in Paqueta
Habana and Erie and established four distinctive features of the law of
nations under § 1350:
1. The law of nations is part of the federal common law, and thus cases
arising under the law of nations also arise under the laws of the United
States as required by Article III of the Constitution;
2. The law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law;"
3. the law of nations must "command the general assent of civilized nations"
to be part of the law of nations and "it is only where the nations of the work
have demonstrated that a wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern by means of express international law violation within the meaning
of the statute."
4. The law of nations must be interpreted "not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."
117. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863 n.5, 878 (W.Va. 1979).
118. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 13, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
119. Id.
120. Park, supra note 3, at 1221.
121. Id. at 1226 n.113.
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public education.1 22
The significance of the United States being a signatory or a full party
to international treaties that proclaim a right to public education is two-
fold. First, as previously mentioned, ratification of such treaties makes
the right a part of federal law, which has the significance of creating a
statutory, even if not a constitutional, right to public education that
ought to trump state laws, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI to the U.S. Constitution. 23
Second, the fact that the United States has entered into treaties and
international agreements calling for international recognition and state
protection of the right to public education is demonstrative of a national
commitment to education as a human necessity that ought not be
denied.124 Entering into these treaties is a mechanism through which
America spreads democratic and humanitarian value across the world. If
the United States continues to be an advocate on the international stage
for human rights, such as education, but leaves the protection of such
rights to the local authority of individual states, America risks breaching
its international commitments. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court
has never held that any international human rights treaty automatically
supersedes inconsistent domestic law.1 25 A U.S. court has held that
Article 47 of the amended Charter of the Organization of American
States (OAS) does not impose an international obligation to provide
public education.126 One U.S. court summarized the United States in
regard to the international right to public education by stating: "The
right to education, while it represents an important international goal,
has not acquired the status of customary international law." 27 This is an
inaccurate summary of the current status of international law and further
demonstrates the American bias against recognizing positive rights. The
United States is a party to the above-mentioned conventions, yet it
consistently falls short of providing a quality of public education
sufficient to satisfy the basic educational needs of an increasingly
complex society. This undermines our nation's international credibility
as a champion of protecting this and other fundamental human rights.
122. "The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their
constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education. . . ."
Organization of American States Charter, art. 49, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesA-
41_CharteroftheOrganizationof AmericanStates.htm [hereinafter O.A.S. Charter].
123. "This Constitution . . . and all Treaties made . . . under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 110; ICESCR, supra note 118; O.A.S.
Charter, supra note 122, arts. 47, 49.
125. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2006).
126. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
127. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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In sum, American scholars and leaders have historically treated
education as though it were an individual right to be protected and
promoted by the state. This American insight has also shown itself in
U.S. foreign policy, as illustrated by the international convention, to
which the United States is either a signatory or a full party. The Court
paid homage to this tradition in Brown v. Board of Education,128 where
it recognized the importance of education, but fatally undermined this
recognition later in Rodriguez.12 9
IV. CRITIQUES OF THE DOCTRINE REGARDING PUBLIC EDUCATION
The seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education is fairly read as
the culmination of the evolving education doctrine to finally recognize a
right to public education.' 30 In Brown, the Court recognized that as a
matter of public policy, the systematic denial of quality education to
minority children was unconstitutional given the importance of
education to American democratic society. 1 Brown explains that a
denial of a quality education is tantamount to the denial of an
individual's full citizenship rights.' 3 2 Brown explains that this is
128. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (holding public school
segregation unconstitutional).
129. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (holding that
there is no constitutional right to public education).
130. Given the general, consistent, and systematic relegation of inadequate resources,
poorer facilities, and inferior services to nonwhites, school segregation was a subtle way of
describing blatant disproportionate resource allocation. See also Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1059-61 (1978).
131. Brown was brought to afford children an equal opportunity to develop their
capabilities:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities . ... [i]t is the very
foundation of good citizenship. . . . [i]t is doubtful that any child may
reasonable be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
132. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, at 111 (Marshall, J., dissenting "[T]he fundamental
importance of education is amply indicated by the prior decisions of this Court. ... this Court's
most famous statement on the subject is that contained in Brown v. Board of Education"); see
Enid Trucios-Haynes & Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism:
Individualism, Race and Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 112 PENN. ST. L. REv. 947, 970
(2008).
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because an individual's ability to effectively exercise their First
Amendment freedoms and thereby fully engage in democratic
deliberation on equal grounds is necessarily dependent upon the quality
of education the individual attains.'3 3 Desegregation was but a means to
an ultimate end: Equal opportunity to attend public schools of
sufficiently high quality to allow students to fully participate in
society. 34
The hopes and possibilities that Brown engendered were abandoned
in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,1s which held that there is no fundamental
right to public education.'3 6 Rodriguez was brought on behalf of
Mexican-American schoolchildren living in an area adversely affected
by a Texas school funding formula.'3 7 The suit challenged the funding
formula for not allocating sufficient funds to the predominantly
minority school district. 3 8
In reaching its conclusion, the Rodriguez court ignored the earlier
recognition that there is a racial dimension to the education debate and
instead chose to conduct a narrow, race-neutral evaluation.139 The
Rodriguez court denied the existence of a fundamental right to public
education by removing the crucial issue of race.140 Once race was off
the table, the Court was then able to redefine the right independent of its
social importance and thereby narrow the scope of what rights would be
deemed fundamental.141 The consequences of this shift in education
133. Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See generally DEWEY, supra note 31, at 183; Henry
L. Chambers Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397,
1411-12 (2002).
134. See generally Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure of
the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 362 (2008).
135. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58-59. See also Powell, supra note 134, at 371-73 (discussing
the decline of the education rights doctrine espoused in Brown v. Board ofEducation).
136. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. In addition to the fundamental rights holding, the Court
also found that the Texas school funding formula did not violate equal protection because it did
not have a disparate impact on the plaintiffs. Id. at 40. See also KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC
MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 189-210, 267-85 (1989).
137. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 29, 30, 35.
140. The Brown and Rodriguez cases were both fundamentally about the denial of equal
educational opportunity based on race. The difference is that in Brown, the Court accepted that
African American children were denied an education. However, Rodriguez denied that race was
a relevant factor, holding there was no necessary correlation between race, a community's
taxable property value, and school financing. This was a peculiar holding, given that the case
was brought by the families of Mexican-American school children, a group with a significant
history of racial discrimination in the United States generally and in Texas specifically. See
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; see Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections
on the Impact and Origins of "The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L. REv. 931,
955 (2008); see generally Powell, supra note 134, at 371-78.
141. Ostensibly, this is based on a concern that broadening the scope of what could be
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rights doctrine are visible in subsequent cases, where the failure to
apply strict scrutiny has made remedying educational inequality much
more difficult. 14 2
This section critiques the current education rights doctrine by first
examining the federalism arguments used to justify the Rodriguez
retreat from education rights contentions, which flow from arguments
that have been historically used to justify odious racial policies. Second,
it examines the extent to which the future growth and success of the
American economy and democracy continues to be linked to
education.143 Finally, the section reveals that the doctrine is flawed
because the Court's confusion regarding fundamental rights has led to
subsequent cases that broadly undermine social equality. Instead, the
Court privileges the rights of those who are already privileged to attend
quality schools over the individual rights of the under-privileged victims
of segregated and underfunded education.14
A. Federalism Arguments
Federalism is central to American democracy and also to the
ongoing debate regarding the constitutional duty to provide public
education. 45
One federalism argument is the states' rights argument, passively
invoked by Justice Powell, which describes the states as having certain
rights under the Constitution; arguing that expansion of federal powers
with regard to education would undermine those rights.146 A second
deemed to be fundamental rights would require the Court to characterize some activities as more
important or fundamental than others, hence making the Court a super-legislature, similar in
effect to the conservative Lochner Court. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30-31, 35. See generally
BICKEL, supra note 37; ELY, supra note 37.
142. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724-725
(2007); see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
143. Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of
the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAw & INEQ. 269, 287-88 (2006) ("Black
students who attend racially integrated and economically integrated schools complete more
years of schooling than those who attend segregated schools.").
144. See also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724-25 (2007); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741 (1974); Freeman, supra note 130, at 1052-54. See generally Powell, supra note 134.
145. Compare Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing how
education has, and should always remain in, local control), with Derolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d
993, 1025 (Ohio 2000) (arguing that too much local control has inequitable results in funding
for school children).
146. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39 (stating that "the Texas system ... should be scrutinized
under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to
the States under the Constitution .. . [l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support
of the school, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well." Id.
(internal citation omitted).
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federalism argument is that the federal government is too large to fully
appreciate the educational issues important to diverse communities
throughout the country and that states are better situated to effectuate
the local community's goals and safeguard the individual's right to
public education.147 Both the states' rights and local control arguments
are borne from the historical context of American slavery and
segregation.
The local control and the states' rights arguments are traceable to a
concept of federalism grounded in protecting the property of southern
slave owners. 148  Southern delegates to the 1787 Constitutional
Convention were very concerned about limiting the federal
government's power to undermine their holdings in human property.149
Charles Pickney, a Constitutional Convention delegate from South
Carolina, spoke in support of the Constitution, saying:
We have a security that the general government can never
emancipate them for no such authority is granted; and . . . the general
government has no such power but what are expressly granted by the
Constitution. . . . [W]e have made the best terms for the security of this
species of property it was in our power to make."so
McConkie concludes that, from the very beginning, principles of
federalism were intertwined with efforts to subordinate racial
minorities.151
Indeed, "[t]he most prominent battles regarding race, civil rights, and
federalism have been in the arena of public education."l 52
Unfortunately, the Court has ruled since Rodriguez that education is an
arena that is not primarily within the federal realm of protection.
Instead, this doctrine falls under the rubric of state and local
147. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44-49 (stating that "[qjuestions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional
presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny ...
[i]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system
than the one before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State . . . we continue to acknowledge that the Justices
of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues . . . the
Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes
become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44-48.
148. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 437 (1856) (arguing for state sovereignty).
149. See Pace Jefferson McConkie, Civil Rights and Federalism Fights: Is there a "More
Perfect Union "for the Heirs to the Promise ofBrown?, 1996 BYU L. REV. 389, 391 (1996).
150. See id at 391; see also THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, vol. 1, at
254-55 (Max Farrand ed. 1937).
151. McConkie, supra note 149, at 391.
152. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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government responsibilities.1 5 3 While the states' rights argument that
local control of school districts is of vital importance was successfully
invoked in Rodriguez, it is also accepted that there is no constitutional
right to local control of a school system that violates the students' civil
rights and guarantees of equal protection.' 54 A fundamental right to
public education would recognize that, at some point, a state's failure to
provide a quality education to a discrete group of its own children is
unconstitutional and that federal courts ought to be required to remedy
such situations.
The thrust of the federalism argument against strict scrutiny is that
local control and state oversight of public schools is a deeply rooted
American tradition.' 5 5 The Rodriguez Court determined that the system
of school financing in question was similar to systems of local, property
tax-based school financing schemes that exist in most other states.
Therefore, the Court held that local, property tax-based school finance
systems are an inappropriate candidate for strict scrutiny.156 A state's
laws for funding education are therefore accorded deference, and federal
courts will only apply the rational basis test, the weakest standard in
equal protection analysis.' 5 7 Under this test, as long as the state
articulates some rationale for its action, the action will be deemed not
unconstitutional, thus allowing gross inequities in education, such as
those in Rodriguez, to continue to exist without any hope of a federal
judicial remedy. 5 8 This logic implicitly places a higher value on a
controversial tradition of local control than on society's real need for a
well-educated citizenry.
1. States' Rights
The first federalism argument against public education is the states'
rights arguments, which itself relies on an antiquated conception of
federalism. States do not have rights in the same way that individuals
have rights. The Constitution does not delineate in either the Ninth
153. Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2607 (2009); Freedman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489
(1992) (education is local in nature); see also Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (N.Y.
2003).
154. Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (education is not a "right" granted
to individuals by the Constitution; but neither is it "merely some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation" (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 203, 221 (2005)).
155. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
156. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44.
157. Id. ("It would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of
financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State").
158. See id.
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Amendment or the Tenth Amendment the precise contours of the
federal government's powers vis-a-vis the states' nor does it describe
what powers are left to the states.159
The framers believed that the structure of the federal government
itself could adequately protect state interests against government power
through the use of the electoral process to represent state interests in
both houses of Congress, especially the Senate. 60 Moreover, even if the
Ninth Amendment and Tenth Amendment originally were meant as
substantive obstacles to the exercise of the federal government's power,
such obstacles, if they ever existed, were removed with respect to equal
protection and racial discrimination with the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment,
collectively known as the Civil War Amendments.'6 1 The express terms
of these amendments subordinate states' rights to the federal protection
of constitutional rights.162 Because school desegregation cases and
equal-educational opportunity cases like Rodriguez are usually brought
as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,
the conclusion that a prior state right to local control ought to trump an
individual right to equal protection is unsound.16 3
2. Local Control
The second federalism argument, local control, assumes that the
states are most capable of effectuating the community's goals and
protecting individual rights. The first part of the argument may be
correct insofar as it describes the greater ability of the states and local
governments to implement the goals of their respective communities.164
The concept of federalism upon which the argument relies has been
159. See McConkie, supra note 149, at 396.
160. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) ("Madison
placed particular reliance on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which he saw
as 'at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual
States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty"') (quoting The Federalist
No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)).
161. McConkie, 1996 BYUL. REv. 389 at 395.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 394.
164. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50 ("The persistence of attachment to government at the
lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters ...
[L]ocal control means ... the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children
... [T]he opportunity it offers for participation in the decision making process that determines
how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local
needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.... Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar
strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to 'serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments').
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revised since the adoption of the Civil War Amendments.
The local control argument ignores the very reason for revising the
antebellum system of federalism, which was the recognition that local
communities often had the improper goal of subordinating racial
minorities. Even Justice Scalia, a strident local control and rights
proponent notes that the framers of the Civil War Amendments
distrusted the states to protect the rights of minorities because "racial
discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the
state and local than at the federal level."l 66
In sum, where it had previously been accepted that states were better
at protecting individual rights than the federal government, which was
then viewed as the body most likely to undermine the individual, the
national concept of federalism shifted as notions of individual rights
broadened to include the rights of racial minorities. After the Civil War
it was the states, not the federal government, that sought to curtail the
rights of its citizens.' 67 The federal government by contrast, has been a
more consistent protector of minority rights. This post-bellum history of
federal minority protection and state-sponsored segregation and
subordination must not be ignored. Presumed race-neutrality permits a
reversion to these antiquated, racially exclusionary, federalism
arguments upon which local control advocates rely.
B. Political and Economic Citizenship
We know that education is everything to our children's future. We
know that they will no longer just compete for good jobs with children
from Indiana, but children from India and China and all over the world.
~ Barack Obama, Chicago Church Speech (June 15, 2008)168
The future growth and success of the U.S. economy and democracy
is tied to education. Since Brown, the Court has recognized that full
165. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
166. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) ("It is an essential attribute of the
States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority."); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 486, 522-23 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); McConkie, supra note 149, at 393.
167. From the Jim Crow laws, to segregated schools, to continuing grossly disparate
educational quality and funding; the states have repeatedly demonstrated themselves to be the
enemy rather than the champion of the rights of its minority citizens. The Fourteenth
Amendment protects the discrete and politically powerless minority from the oppression of the
majority. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (coining the term "tyranny of the majority"); THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison) (the violence of the majority faction).
168. Barack Obama, Father's Day 2008, in CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN: BARACK
OBAMA'S PLAN TO RENEW AMERICA'S PROMISE 233,237 (Obama for America ed., 2008).
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democratic participation requires each person to obtain a baseline level
of knowledge and understanding.'6 9 America's leaders from across the
political spectrum have recognized the importance of public
education.' However, despite its recognized importance, the Court
continues to deny the existence of a constitutional duty to provide
public education because it is not "amon the rights afforded explicit
protection under our federal Constitution." I However, the right can be
regarded as a precursor to other rights, including the right to vote.' 72
In addition to the democratic concerns, the research and scholarship
confirms that a nation's economic prosperity is dependent upon the
quality of education it provides its children today. 7 3
Many welfare economists recognize a linkl74 between quality
education and national prosperity as measured by gross domestic
product (GDP).' 75 According to Phillip Stevens and Martin Weale from
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the connection
is demonstrated by the following formula:
In GDP per Capita = 0.35 in enrollment rate + 5.23176
"Thus this formula suggests that a one per cent increase in the
enrolment rate raises GDP by 0.35 per cent." 77 According to Stevens
and Weale's theory, increased investments in education ultimatel
increase innovation, which in the long-term increases a nation's GDP.
Education is important to both the U.S. economy and to democracy.
169. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
170. See President Barack Obama, McCain-Obama Speeches at 99th NAACP Convention
(July 12, 2008), available at http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/2008_NAACP Barack
Obama.htm ("[T]he fight for social justice and economic justice begins in the classroom."); No
Child Left Behind Policy (Jan. 8, 2002) ("If our country fails in its responsibility to educate
every child, we are likely to fail in many other areas."). See also id. ("'If a nation expects to be
ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.'-
Thomas Jefferson, 1816").
171. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 4, 35 (1973).
172. See id. at 36.
173. Philip Stevens & Martin Weale, Education and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL
HIANDBOOK ON THE EcoNoMics OF EDUCATION 164, 164 (Geraint Johnes ed., 2004).
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id. "There are two very basic reasons for expecting to find some link between
education and economic growth. First of all at the most general level it is intuitively plausible
that living standards have risen so much over the last millennium and in particular since 1800
because of education. . . . Secondly, at a more specific level, a wide range of econometric
studies indicate that the incomes individuals can command depend on their level of education.
... The process of education can be analysed as an investment decision." Id. at 164.
177. The formula is based on long term observations of the effect of education on an
economy. Id. at 167.
178. See id.
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It was not an accident that both education rights and securing the right
to vote were two central aims of the 1960's Civil Rights movement.
Education and voter franchisement are linked and of primary
importance in democratic society. Voting rights and the Fifteenth
Amendment arose out of the reconstruction era concern that southern
whites would attempt to deny the newly freed blacks the franchise. This
concern proved justified when immediately after the Tilden-Hayes
Compromise Union troops were withdrawn from the South. 7 9
Southerners then enacted a series of Jim Crow laws which purpose and
effect were to deny blacks the right to vote.' 8 0 The relevance of this is
that the movement to secure integrated public education in the middle of
the twentieth century was a part of a greater, overall movement to
abolish Jim Crow laws specifically and American racial hierarchy
generally. Insofar as Brown's holding rings true, that separate is
inherently unequal, the struggle for educational equity is necessarily
federal in scope.' 8 '
Unfortunately, the Rodriguez Court did not find the voting rights
arguments convincing.182 Perhaps this was because the notion of "a
right to vote" was one that the ma ority did not entirely accept as
existing under the U.S. Constitution. Justice Powell undermined the
existence of the right when he stated: "Since the right to vote, per se, is
not a constitutionally protected right, we assume that appellees'
references to that right are simply shorthand references to the protected
right, implicit in our constitutional system."' 84 Justice Powell's
undermining of the constitutional quality of the right to vote may be
because he and others still perceived civil rights as minority rights and
not yet as human rights. 1 In light of previous and subsequent
179. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 61-62 (1976)
180. A few examples from 1890 to 1908 include requirements for poll taxes, residency
requirements, rule variations, literacy and understanding tests that achieved power through
selective application against minorities, or were particularly hard for the poor to fulfill. Richard
H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const. Comment. 295, 295-96
(2000).
181. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
182. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 4, 36 (1973).
183. Id. at 35, n.78.
184. Id.
185. See id.; see also Thomas Basile, Recent Development: Inventing the "Right to Vote,"
in Crawford v. Marion Election Board, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 438 n.5 (2009)
("Importantly, the Court never has held that the Fourteenth Amendment endows American
citizens with an independent and freestanding right to vote that can be invoked, for example, to
compel the government to render unelected public positions subject to direct election by voters.
Rather, as a product of the Equal Protection Clause strand of the Court's "'fundamental rights'
jurisprudence, the essence of the right to vote is that, once the government chooses to extend the
franchise to citizens, it must do so on an equal basis.").
75
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY
affirmations of the right to vote, most reasonable people would agree
that it is time to revisit this aspect of the Court's holding.186
At the time Rodriguez was decided, the enforcement of the right to
vote was primarily seen as a means of expanding the franchise to racial
minorities.187 Given the racial backdrop and the majority's denigration
of the right to vote, one could conclude that despite the Court's formal
statements to the contrary, race and judgments as to the value of racial
equality were at the core of Rodriguez. Like voting rights for blacks, the
Rodriguez Court demonstrated an analogous hostility towards education
rights for Mexican-Americans.18 8 The Court here chose to ignore race as
a formal concern, describing the primary motive as economic.1 89
Bitensky is one of many scholars, including the aforementioned
Dewey, who acknowledges a necessary connection between education
and the right to vote.190 Bitensky's basic argument with regard to this
right's connection to education is that the existence of a right to vote
seems unquestionable given the Supreme Court's unambiguous
articulation of the right in Reynolds v. Sims.191 Although some
commentators, including Justice Powell and the Rodriguez majority as
noted earlier, have expressed some ambivalence regarding the
constitutional character of the right to vote, most scholars and
practitioners accept that there is a right to vote under the U.S.
Constitution. 192 Bitensky's basic argument with regard to this right's
connection to education is that "[i]nsofar as it may be assumed that a
constitutional right to vote exists . . . then there must also exist a
correlative, implied positive right to education . . . because it is
education which makes the vote meaningful."' 93
186. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 135
(1970); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
187. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630; Oregon, 400 U.S. at 135; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
188. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-6.
189. See id.
190. Bitensky, supra note 20, at 574-79; see also U.S. House Judiciary Committee,
Preserving Democracy, 14 (Jan. 5 2005) ("Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Reynolds and its progeny require that votes that are cast must actually be counted.
The Equal Protection Clause also requires that all methods the 'legislature has prescribed' to
preserve the right to vote be effected, not thwarted").
191. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 ("Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects
the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections."); Chambers, Jr.,
supra note 133, at 1425-26 ("[tlhe right to vote that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
infringement can be found in state law or more generally in the Constitution as a fundamental
right that has evolved from the Constitution . . ." Given the context in which it was passed and
its goal of providing political equality through its requirement of equal voting rights, the
Fifteenth Amendment should protect such rights somewhat more aggressively than the
Fourteenth Amendment protects other constitutional rights.").
192. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36.
193. See Bitensky, supra note 20, at 606.
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The Court itself has acknowledged the democratic significance of
education.194 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, issued one year before the
infamous Rodriguez decision, the Court discussed the democratic
necessity of education stating that "education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence." 1 Education
becomes increasingly important as electoral choices continue to
implicate the understanding of ever more complicated issues.1 96 While
making a meaningful electoral choice may not necessitate an ability to
comprehend the intricacies of every monumental issue of today,
politically purposive, electoral conduct does at least require that citizens
be capable of attaining an understanding of these issues and how
different policies may ultimately impact them.' 97 Denial of a quality
education is a denial of the intellectual tools necessary for the
meaningful exercise of the franchise, amounting to an effective denial
of the right to vote.
C. Privileging the Privileged
The Court's failure to acknowledge a federal constitutional duty to
provide quality public education'" has a disproportionately negative
impact on minorities. What has been described as the Court's colorblind
or race-neutral approach to education rights has in fact effectively given
license to continuing racial inequality in education and has barred
efforts to stop the current wave of school resegregation.199 The problem
of a purportedly liberal concept of colorblindness furthering racial
inequality has been well discussed and widely acknowledged. In the
education context, racial inequality is exacerbated by privileging the
rights of the privileged, which has been accomplished by cramming the
right to public education-a duty that must be fulfilled by the
government-into the Court's current fundamental rights analysis,
which is more appropriate for negative rights or liberties.
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court applied the Rodriguez line of race-
neutral, negative rights-based reasoning to rule against allowing an
interdistrict school busing remedy to address segregated schools in
Detroit and the surrounding areas. 200 There the Court determined the
194. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
195. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
196. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36.
197. See Bitensky, supra note 20, at 604.
198. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 4 (1973) ("This case failed
to recognize a federal constitutional duty to provide quality public education.").
199. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36.
200. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
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segregative impact of "white flight" to the Detroit suburbs to be "mere"
de facto segregation that was not subject to judicial relief.201 Milliken
set the precedent for judicial inaction in what has become the all-too-
typical story of the segregative impact of the "white flight"
phenomenon. The Court's education jurisprudence effectively ensures
that the segregative impact of white flight will continue unchecked and
thereby further educational inequality, as is seen in the more recent
Parents Involved case. 202
1. Privileging Perspective
The Court has applied federalism-inspired local control arguments as
a basis for ruling that busing and other segregation remedies involving
more than a single school district are unconstitutional.203 An early
example of this is Milliken v. Bradley, where the majority held that such
an inter-district remedy may only be applied where the suburban white
school district contributed to or enabled unconstitutional school
segregation within the non-white urban school district.204 While the
Rodriguez majority was able to pretend that race was not a pertinent
factor in its equal protection analysis, 205 the Milliken majority could not
so easily ignore race in a case about the clearly segregated Detroit City
school district.206 Instead, the Court adopted what Professor Alan David
Freeman has termed a perpetrator's perspective by privileging the
liberty of white suburbanites to local control over their schools over the
rights of the minority children to receive a racially integrated, quality
201. Id. at 748.
202. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
see Powell, supra note 134, at 410.
203. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to
quality of the educational process.").
204. The Court reasoned that an inter-district remedy to a demonstrated violation of Equal
Protection, even if it occurs within the same state, ultimately serves to undermine the core
principles of local control. In reaching its holding, the Milliken court invoked the de jure/de
facto distinction, claiming that because the suburban districts in question were not currently and
had not previously been part of a legally mandated scheme of segregation, the resulting
segregation was the result of private action and amounted to defacto segregation. The Court
ruled that defacto segregation is not subject to judicial relief. See id. at 745.
205. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 4, 37-38 (1973).
206. "[A]n interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of
one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district
lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. . . . With no showing of significant
violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or
effect, the court went beyond the original theory of the case as framed by the pleadings and
mandated a metropolitan area remedy." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (discussing requirement for
segregative intent).
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education,20 7 thus ignoring the continuing wrong done to the victims.208
By valuing the importance of leaving "non-guilty parties" alone, higher
than the importance of making the victims whole, the Court devalued
the victims and their injury.2 0 9
Justice Douglas, in his Milliken dissent, recognizes a glaring
inconsistency in the Court's approach to a Detroit metropolitan area
remedy.210  For Douglas, the state action requirement was met in
Milliken, especially when analogized to previous cases where the Court
had recommended metropolitan treatment of metropolitan problems.2 11
However, the Court chose to treat school desegregation discretely by
respecting boundaries of administrative convenience over the
segregated reality of Detroit area schools.212
Arguably, there is no significant constitutional difference between de
facto and dejure segregation in the public schools context since "[e]ach
school board performs state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes
when it draws the lines that confine it to a given area, when it builds
schools . . . when it allocates students." 2  The segregated Detroit
207. Milliken looked past the plaintiffs main point, which was not based on an argument
regarding the range of legal fairness to the suburbanites who would have become a part of a
Detroit area "super-district." Rather, the main point of the suit was to undo the wrong caused to
the Detroit children by racially motivated white-flight from the Detroit schools. The decision,
however, is a perfect example of the Court invoking Freeman's perpetrator perspective. Under
Freeman's theory, the concept of racial discrimination may be approached from two
perspectives: that of the victims, and that of its perpetrators. The victim perspective appreciates
the conditions of actual social existence as a member of a subordinated group. The perpetrator
perspective does not describe racial discrimination in terms of conditions but describes it in
terms of actions or a series of actions inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The core
difference is that the perpetrator perspective focuses more on what the perpetrator has done,
whereas the victim perspective focuses more on the condition of the victim. See id. at 745;
Freeman, supra note 130, at 1052-54.
208. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (looking only to whether there was purposeful
discrimination regardless of affect).
209. See id. at 754 (requiring proof of intentional discrimination, perpetrator's prospective,
rather than focusing on the segregative affect on minority education, victims prospective).
210. Id. at 758 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If this were a sewage problem or a water problem
or an energy problem, there can be no doubt that Michigan would stay well within federal
constitutional bounds if it sought a metropolitan remedy.").
211. See id.
212. See id.
213.
The creation of the school districts in Metropolitan Detroit either maintained
existing segregation or caused additional segregation. Restrictive covenants
maintained by state action or inaction build black ghettos. It is state action
when public funds are dispensed by housing agencies to build racial ghettos.
Where a community is racially mixed and school authorities segregate
schools, or assign black teachers to black schools or close schools in fringe
areas and build new schools in black areas and in more distant white areas,
the State creates and nurtures a segregated school system, just as surely as
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schools were not the defacto or "natural" result of private choices, but
the desired and intentional result of de jure acts of segregation that
helped grow a core of black-only schools within Detroit, thus
encouraging African Americans to move into parts of Detroit and
encouraging whites to move elsewhere. 2 14
Despite the obvious problems with Milliken, the Court today applies
an expanded perpetrator's perspective that today threatens to enshrine
215
resegregation and racialized educational inequity as the status quo.
As Professor Powell notes, "Parents Involved is the 21st Century
affirmation of the Court's narrow approach [in Milliken]."216 In Parents
Involved, the Court held racially-based school integration efforts to be
unconstitutional, based in part on the notion that using race as criteria,
even to further integration, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause.
According to Professor Powell, the Court's view is that while "there
are vestiges of discrimination that can be remedied by desegregation
decrees . . . there are 'other desegregative forces' which are
irremediable . . . [For the Court] resegregation is a 'natural'
occurrence." 218
We see here the impact the Rodriguez decision has had on education
to the point that its holding has now been applied to effectively run
counter to the integration goals of Brown. In continuing to apply the
libertarian perspective, the Parents Involved court privileged the liberty
interests of white suburbanites over the duty to provide all children an
integrated education. The application is that today, resegregation and
resulting educational inequalities across school districts are natural or
defacto occurrences in the sense that these inequalities are not the result
of any intentional state action. Rather, for the Court, they are the result
of racially motivated private actions that the state ought not attempt to
219
cure.
Given the American tendency to protect the privileges of already
privileged whites over the rights of minorities, it would be more
did those States involved in Brown when they maintained dual school
systems.
Id. at 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas analogizes state action in the educational
context to state action and inaction in the context of racially restrictive covenants. Id.
214. Powell, supra note 134, at 410 (quoting Milliken, 409-10 U.S. at 805 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
215. Id. at410.
216. Id. at 411.
217. Id. at 402; Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
734-35 (2007).
218. Powell, supra note 134.
219. Id. at 114.
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appropriate for the Court to remedy the discrimination, rather than
continue to regard the perpetrators' liberty interests as controlling.220
Yet the liberty interests of privileged suburban whites continue to trump
the education rights of minorities as seen in Parents Involved. In this
case, simply using race as a factor in school placement decisions, as a
method of encouraging integration, was held to be unconstitutional. 221
2. Privileging Liberty over Duty
The current education rights doctrine combines the perpetrators'
perspective, described above, with a negative rights or a libertarian
perspective.222 The libertarian perspective is primarily concerned with
maintaining existing privileges and liberties, while deemphasizing the
importance of positive rights or duties. The libertarian perspective
helps to enshrine an unjust distribution of resources by protecting the
rights of the unfairly privileged to maintain exclusive privileges. In
the context of the modern educational doctrine, ruling that a government
cannot integrate across school districts gave local governments the
liberty to act without being hindered.224 The consistent privileging of
local government liberties over the duty that the government owes its
people helped to block desegregation efforts in Milliken.225 This
negative rights, or liberty bias, has had repercussions beyond the
educational context. Milliken arguably served as a catalyst for escalating
the white flight phenomenon away from cities and other urban areas like
Detroit.226
The de facto/de jure distinction invoked by the Court in Milliken
illustrates the general problem the Court has faced in recognizing a
general, private, liberty right at the expense of duties or positive rights,
especially when those duties are owed to minorities.227 Minorities are
expected to sacrifice some portion of their rights rather than risk
infringing on the majority's liberty. 228
One reason for concern regarding situations like Milliken is that as
220. See Freeman, supra note 130, at 1059-61.
221. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 11-12.
222. See generally James P. Sterba, From Liberty to Welfare, 106 EThucs 64 (1994).
223. See West, supra note 56, at 831.
224. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974).
225. See generally Powell, supra note 134.
226. Batchis, supra note 68, at 120.
227. See Watson v. Fort Watson, 487 U.S. 977, 1000 (1988) (holding that a minority
employee had not met her burden of proof under the discriminatory treatment evidentiary
standard and therefore dismissed the action); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976);
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
228. Contra THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing importance of protecting
minority rights at the cost of the majority's liberty).
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affluent whites flee, they take with them their property taxes, which is
the primary basis for funding education under most of the funding
229 adiin
schemes used throughout the United States. In addition, American
society attaches a negative stigma to all institutions that are
predominantly minority. 30 The value of an integrated education to
minority students lies therefore not just in the existence of funds, but
also in the credibility of having attended schools of merit.
As Justice Marshall notes in his dissent,
Racially identifiable schools are one of the primary vestiges of state-
imposed segregation which an effective desegregation decree must
attempt to eliminate . . . there is a presumption against schools that are
substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. . . . The goal
229.
[Slubtle segregationist policies are illustrated most forcefully in the context of
school funding. .. . This . . . occurs in schools throughout the country, where
segregated housing patterns result in the existence of predominantly black,
inner-city schools, and predominantly white, suburban schools. The funding
discrepancy between the wealthy suburbs and poor cities is largely a product of
local laws governing property taxes, upon which most schools in this nation
depend for their initial funding property tax revenues depend upon the taxable
value of homes and local industries. Thus, a wealthy suburb with highly valued
homes provides a much larger tax base in proportion to its student population
than an inner-city occupied by thousands of destitute persons. . . . The federal
income tax scheme appears to exacerbate these systemic funding discrepancies.
Because the federal government allows property taxes to be deducted from
taxable income . . . This tax deduction essentially is tantamount to a federal
public education subsidy.
See Jared A. Levy, Blinking at Reality: The Implications of Justice Clarence Thomas's
Influential Approach to Race and Education, 78 B.U. L. REv. 575, 604-06 (1998).
230. See generally Nia Mason, Minority Recruitment Efforts Aimed at Increasing Student
Diversity at Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities and Predominantly White
Public Institutions (May 2006) (unpublished M.M.C. thesis, Louisiana State University) (on file
with Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Library, Louisiana State University) (on file with
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Library, Louisiana State University) (citing Marybeth
Gasman, Brown v. Board's Legacy and Contemporary Black Higher Education, 8 DIVERSITY
DIG. 8, 8-9 (2004).
[T]here has been a stigma of inferiority attached to [Historically black colleges
and universities] HBCUs since their establishment. Part of this stigma is the
idea that all HBCUs are substandard in comparison with [Predominantly White
Institutions] PWIs, and they are consequently lumped into one category.
Although strides are being made to overcome these stereotypes, attracting
white students to institutions that are viewed as socially substandard has proved
difficult.
Id. at 18-19.
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is a school system without white schools or Negro schools-a system
with just schools.231
As Justice Marshall saw it, the problem with the Milliken decision,
limiting the scope of desegregation efforts to just the Detroit schools,
was that it would not achieve actual desegregation. The opportunity to
meet and study alongside children of the wealthy and privileged opens
up a lifetime of opportunities that segregated systems deprive non-
white, non-affluent students of.2 32
Our courts should not follow a course that leaves the full burden of
segregative harms on the victims for fear of undermining the liberty of
the privileged.233 Today, minority children continue to suffer the
negative results of an inherently racist allocation of resources and
continuing actual segregation in America's schools. 234 The Court should
cast aside its current libertarian perspective and instead begin a positive
rights-based education jurisprudence. Viewed from a positive
perspective, unequal educational resource distribution and segregated
schooling is a violation of a state's duties to its citizens. Inequality is
neither a natural nor is it a constitutionally acceptable status quo. Our
current private liberty-privileging situation is no fairer and no more
consistent with the U.S. Constitution than a system that would
guarantee everyone in America an equal opportunity to succeed.
V. JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
The fact that many clauses of the Constitution tend to independently
support the existence of an education right strengthens the argument
that the Constitution itself supports a right to public education. At least
one scholar has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause creates a negative right in the sense that "rather than imposing
any affirmative obligation upon government to provide education, it
simply forbids government from impeding individuals in their quest for
information and enlightenment." 235 It follows that independent to the
231. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 802-03 (1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1,25-26 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,44 (1968)).
232. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 14.
233. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's answer . . .
provide[s] no remedy at all for the violation proved in this case, thereby guaranteeing that Negro
children in Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future
as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past.").
234. JESSE L. JACKSON JR. & FRANK E. WATKINS, A MORE PERFECT UNION ADVANCING
NEw AMERICAN RIGHTS 230 (1st ed. 2001).
235. See Bitensky, supra note 20, at 553, 564.
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aforementioned need to recognize a constitutional duty to provide
public education, the document necessarily presupposes a well-educated
citizenry in order to bring meaning to the other rights it implicates. 236
A. Judicial Recognition Approaches
David Thompson argues that the existing case law does not
necessarily preclude finding education as a fundamental right.237
According to Thompson, precedent is ambiguous with regard to the
scope of federal protection for education. 38 Several cases after
Rodriguez indicate there is some limited federal protection of education
and that equal protection at least extends to unreasonable governmental
action.239 Current precedent fails to both fully protect and fully reject
the notion of constitutionally protecting education. 240
Plyler v. Doe is one case that highlights the current ambiguity
regarding education's status as a federal right.24 1 The issue in Plyler, a
case brought a decade after Rodriguez, was whether the state of Texas
could deny free public education to the school-age children of
undocumented immigrants. 242 Here, the Court held that immigrants,
even immigrants whose presence in this country is unlawful, are entitled
to equal protection under the law. 243 Though the Court explicitly stated
that education is not a right protected by the U.S. Constitution, it
nonetheless recognized the fundamental role education plays in
American society. 2 "In sum, education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of [American] society. We cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne to our Nation when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests." 245
Absent the furtherance of some substantial state purpose, the Court
held that denying the school-age children of undocumented immigrants
an education to violated the equal protection clause.246 According to
Thompson, this essentially amounts to intermediate scrutiny, requiring
236. DEWEY, supra note 31, at 183.
237. David C. Thompson, School Finance and the Courts: A Reanalysis of Progress, 59
EDUC. LAW REP. 945, 950 (1990).
238. Id.
239. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 273, 275 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221-22 (1982); Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1279 (Conn. 1996).
240. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 273, 285; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1279.
241. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
242. Id. at 205.
243. See id. at 215.
244. See id at 202.
245. Id. at 221.
246. See id. at 224.
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that the scheme must be "substantially related to an important state
interest."247
Another example of the Court's ambiguous stance on the
fundamentality of education is Papasan v. Allain, a case about a gross
disparity in educational financing by the state of Mississippi in lands
previously held by the Chickasaw Indian Nation. 24 8 The Court here said
that though education is not itself a fundamental right, there still might
249
exist a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. Such a
fundamental right would trigger strict scrutiny. "As Rodriguez and
Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions
whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be
accorded equal protection review." 250 The Papasan Court vacated the
lower court's judgment regarding the equal protection claim, holding
that the allegation of discrimination, absent a legitimate state interest,
was sufficient to state a cause of action under the equal protection
clause and must be decided on remand.2 5 1 According to Thompson,
"though Papasan failed to test the federal question, it clearly indicated
some limited federal protection for education as the court ruled that
Equal Protection at least extends to unreasonable governmental
action. 252
Examining Plyler and Papasan in the context of the Rodriguez
decision, there is an apparent progression in the levels of scrutiny that
are deemed relevant in educational discrimination cases.253 In Plyler,
the Court applied intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard in
reviewing a state law denying the children of undocumented immigrants
254
education. In Papasan, the Court left open the possibility of
examining some education discrimination cases as involving the denial
of a fundamental right.255 These cases together demonstrate, as
Thompson argues, that the Court's overall division and hesitancy in this
area has left open the possibility of a strict scrutiny fundamental rights
247. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650 (1969).
248. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) ("Some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningfiul exercise of either [the
right to speak or the right to vote]").
249. See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 289.
252. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 950.
253. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 215, 230; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
254. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
255. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284 ("Some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or
the right to vote]").
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analysis for education cases. 256 It follows from these cases that the
Court has not clearly stated that a state's denial to a child of a minimally
adequate education does not violate a fundamental constitutional
right.257 Thompson's approach to gaining judicial recognition of a right
to public education invokes the notion of minimal adequacy expounded
in these cases. 25 8 He argues that the Court has itself recognized that
there is a right to public education, which is implied by the
Constitution.
B. Critiques ofJudicial Recognition Approaches
Under Thompson's "minimal adequacy" approach, there continues
to exist a possibility for the Court to recognize some form of
fundamental right to public education that will be fully2 rotected as
though it were explicitly written into the Constitution. 0 Although
Thompson's approach to judicial recognition of the right does not
foreclose the possibility for strict scrutiny as the standard of review for
education rights cases, the notion of minimal adequacy itself creates
some problems. 261
The concept of a "minimally adequate education" flows from
language used in Rodriguez and its progeny.26 2 This language has since
been applied to describe the quality of education that is necessary to
obtain the level of knowledge necessary for full democratic
participation.2 6 3
The recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education would not sufficiently reflect the significance of education to
American society.264 Something more than minimal adequacy ought to
be invoked to properly encapsulate the importance of education in
contributing to individuals capabilities as citizens. A shift in rhetoric to
a minimal adequacy standard would amount to little change in the level
scrutiny shown to education cases because minimal adequacy is the
256. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 952.
257. See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 289; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
258. See Thompson, 394 U.S. at 952.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 ("Education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation." (alteration of original)); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33
(1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
262. Black, supra note 38, at 1406 (noting that the Rodriguez court left open the question
of whether there is a federal fundamental right to a minimally adequate education).
263. Id. at 1408 ("A minimally adequate education can be nothing less than the qualitative
minimums that the states have indicated students must receive").
264. See id.
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current effective standard.265 Ultimately this approach fails to address
the fundamental problem: the need for quality education for all
Americans, regardless of race, wealth, or lineage; and the lack of a legal
recourse when that necessity is denied.
Furthermore, minimal adequacy is grounded in the same negative
rights-based standards of liberty that led to the states' current failure to
fully enforce the duties the state owes to its children. The state owes
duties that go beyond preparing its citizens to properly fulfill their
obligations as citizens.
However, neither rational basis review nor strict judicial scrutiny of
existing laws regarding public education fully addresses the scope of the
government's duty to provide a public education. A new positive rights-
based jurisprudence is necessary for appropriately addressing the
distinct issues regarding state, including duties such as the duty to
provide a public education.
The current doctrine that there is no right to public education flows
from the profound confusion regarding fundamental rights as duties.
Negative rights or liberties are primarily protections from government
infringement on individual activities and prohibitions on government
actions that discriminate against a protected classes. Examples include
the fundamental right to travel and the right to procreation, neither of
which are explicit in the text of the Constitution.267 However, both of
these are interpreted to bar the government from taking action that
infringes on either of the liberties but do not require the government to
actually take any action.26 8 The current levels of equal protection
265. While the state constitution creates a fundamental right to "general and uniform
system of education" for the purposes of equal protection analysis, that right does not extend to
funding education systems beyond providing basic funding to assure that a general and uniform
system is maintained and, thus, while strict scrutiny analysis should be applied in determining
whether a legislature has met a student's fundamental right to general and uniform system of
public schools, a lesser standard of rational basis test should apply to determine whether
financing of such a system is thorough and efficient. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299,
315 (Minn. 1993).
266. But see Black, supra note 38, at 1406-09; Id. at 1369 n. 117 ("Some commentators
project that adequacy litigation, as well as No Child Left Behind, may have their own negative
consequence: legislatures lowering their qualitative standards to demonstrate more easily that
students are meeting them."). Id. at 1389-90 ("[H]igh profile litigation, failed litigation in
particular, could easily educate the public and focus its attention on immediate change in a way
that organizing alone might take years to do. This has proven true on more than one occasion at
the state level.").
267. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-07 (1999); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); Joseph 0. Oluwole, Public Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: A New
Constitutional Test for Disciplined Whistleblowers, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 464-65
(2008) (recognizing that a fundamental right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution).
268. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) ("'Compelling' is of course
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scrutiny-rational basis test, intermediate and strict scrutiny-are well-
suited for protecting negative rights or liberties, but are not as useful in
269
enforcing positive rights or duties.
A lawsuit to declare a law void and unenforceable is essentially
different from a lawsuit seeking to require the government to act and
provide a service. 27 0 It is not that courts are capable of only addressing
the former, as evidenced by the already existing models for such suits in
areas of Social Security, Medicare, and other "entitlement litigation." 271
Rather, the problem is that the Court's current rights analysis effectively
conflates liberties and duties so that the same negative rights-styled
analysis applies to all constitutional rights.272 What this translates to, in
the context of education, is a situation where the Court is comfortable
announcing the significance of education, but uncomfortable declaring
it a fundamental right.273
Viewed from the perspective of rights as liberties, the concern with
declaring a fundamental right to education is that education would be
strictly scrutinized, thus causing the undesired result of preventing the
enactment of laws regarding education.274 This would not be a concern
if the Court embraced a constitutional analysis that specifically applied
to positive rights and duties. The details of such an analysis are beyond
the key word; where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is
involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state
interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ("Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of
interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it
promotes a compelling state interest."), rev'd on other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
269. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985); In re Cox,
393 B.R. 681, 688-89 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); Samuel L. Bufford, Constitutional Problems in
the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2008).
270. B. Jessie Hill, New Scholarship on Reproductive Rights: Reproduction Rights as
Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 502-03 (2009) ("A positive right is
generally considered to be an entitlement to soiething-a right to call on the government to
provide, at government expense, a particular public good, such as shelter, education, or medical
care.... Negative rights, by contrast, are simply rights to be free of governmental interference
with one's decision to do something; they are 'negative checks on government, preserving a
sphere of private immunity").
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003) (suggesting a university's
mission to educate its employees to be important); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S.
410, 437 (1993) ("[The Court] ha[s] consistently recognized the importance of education to the
professional and personal development of the individual."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 4, 30 (1973) ("[T]he grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society cannot be doubted.").
274. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724-25
(2007).
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the scope of this Article, but in the context of education, the primary
function of a positive fundamental rights analysis would be to scrutinize
a government's failure to provide high-quality education. Unlike the
current negative rights analysis, the emphasis would not be on whether
to void existing laws or bar government action, but on whether to
mandate that action be taken.275
The doctrine of stare decisis does not make judicial recognition of a
fundamental right to public education impossible. Explicit recognition
that positive fundamental rights or duties require a new, different type
of constitutional analysis would allow the Court the freedom to go
beyond its currently narrow rights jurisprudence, which would have an
impact in areas that go beyond the education context.
We are living in a transitional point in U.S. history that bears
similarities to the circumstances surrounding the New Deal. This
moment of political and economic change carries with it the possibility
for what Ackerman describes as a constitutional moment that transforms
jurisprudential thought. Judicial recognition of a government duty-a
positive right to public education-would be just one of many potential
positive new rights that could flow from a duty-centered rights analysis.
Bruce Ackerman describes at some length the significance of social
movements in driving changes in jurisprudential thought.276 Ackerman
describes the point at which a social movement is capable of achievin
such a shift in jurisprudential thought as a constitutional moment.2
According to Ackerman, constitutional moments are "rare moments
when transformative movements earn broad and deep support for their
initiatives. Once a reform movement survives its period of trial, the
Constitution tries to assure that its initiatives have an enduring place in
future political life." 2 78 The goal of these transformative social
movements is to amend societal understandings of the Constitution.
Their success in doing so, according to Ackerman, does not necessarily
require a textual, Article V constitutional amendment. 279 Rather, the
Constitution can be and has been amended extra-textually through
successful transformative movements.280
275. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35. The Court refused to mandate equal access to
quality education, but instead limited its options to either declaring the system unconstitutional
or upholding the system. See id.
276. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
277. See id. at 160, 248, 409-11, 420; Michael Salerno, Reading Is Fundamental: Why The
No Child Left Behind Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5
CARDozo PUB. L. POL'Y & Emics J. 509, 539 (2007) (implies a fundamental right to education
through creation of NCLB).
278. See ACKERMAN, supra note 276, at 4-5; Salerno, supra note 277, at 539.
279. See ACKERMAN, supra note 276, at 15; Salerno, supra note 277, at 539.
280. Once a social movement has succeeded in organizing a broad enough base of
Americans for a fundamental shift in our overall social, political, and legal understandings, then
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VI. CONCLUSION
The government's role in providing public education is more than
simply preparing its youth to govern. The purpose is both to safeguard
liberty and to satisfy the State's positive duty to provide all children an
equal opportunity to fully develop their capabilities.281 There is an
intimate link between education and democracy, as well as between
education and economic prosperity. Education becomes increasingly
important as electoral choices continue to require the understanding of
ever more complicated issues. A denial of a quality education is a denial
of the intellectual tools necessary for the meaningful exercise of the
franchise, amounting to an effective denial of the right to vote.
An ongoing negative rights bias, embodied in the Court's libertarian
perspective, has stifled the development of a positive rights-based
jurisprudence. A new positive rights-based jurisprudence is necessary
for appropriately addressing the distinct issues regarding state duties,
such as the duty to provide a public education. Without an equitable
distribution of the educational tools necessary for success in the
economic marketplace and in America's democratic society, the very
foundation of American society is called into question. Insofar as a
broad, transformative movement would highlight the inequitable
distribution of educational opportunities, foundational questions as to
societal legitimacy and the appropriateness of America's assumed
meritocracy will inevitably be raised. In the face of a sufficiently
widespread social movement, courts will have little choice but to
recognize the existence of a positive right to public education.
Transforming the doctrine regarding the right to public education is a
task of constitutional proportions. The movement to recognize a
fundamental right to public education could, and should, spearhead an
even broader jurisprudential movement that goes beyond the current
negative fundamental rights analysis that focuses on preventing
government action. What is needed is a constitutional analysis for
protecting positive fundamental rights in order to ensure that
government fulfills its constitutional duties to the people.
the possibility exists for constitutional codification, either by means of a textual amendment, or
through judicial opinions, rather than through formal amendments. The above-described story of
the education doctrine, post-Rodriguez, would therefore not be the story of a slavish adherence
to stare decisis, but of a social movement that had not reached the point where it could effect a
full and complete shift in jurisprudential thought. Such an action may have been seen as the
manifestation of what Ackerman characterizes as a constitutional moment, had the Court
overruled Plessy outright. See ACKERMAN, supra note 276, at 160, 183-85, 248, 409-11, 420;
Salerno, supra note 277, at 539.
281. See Sarlerno, supra note 277, at 539.
[Vol. 2290
